Greg Detre
@ 20:30 on Wednesday, 07 November, 2001
Prof. David Papineau
book to be published in March � this is the last chapter
assumptions
1. materialism - type physicalist � ontological monism
nomological character of the physical
psychophysical causal interaction
the consequence of denying this is epiphenomenalism
2. two very different types of concepts for thinking about the same property
can think materially vs phenomenally
cf Jackson�s �Mary� � arg for dualism? no, shows the extra set of concepts beyond the material (the neural activity)
phenomenal concepts are not necessarily non-material
phenomenal concept = compound demonstrative term � �this experience�
consciousness as �determinable property� � splits into determinates of pain, seeing an elephant etc.
3. a science of consciousness = empirical attempt to identify the material reference of phenomenal concepts, e.g. pain, seeing something red
assumptions 1 + 2 don�t on their own specify which phenomenal concepts refer to which material referents
hard vs easy problem � well, Papineau thinks that there is no hard problem
Chalmers agrees with assumption 2, but not assumption 1
4. consciousness research hinges on subject�s phenomenal reports about their current conscious experiences (difficult to argue for)
you try and figure out what�s going on in their brains, using EEGs or fMRIs or whatever � and then you ask them what it was like for them while they were doing the task etc.
look for something materially in common between all the people who claim to be seeing something red, and then we have found the material reference for the phenomenal concept of seeing red
what about creatures that can�t give verbal reports, e.g. monkeys? you never know whether you�ve found the material essence of a monkey seeing something red
you could rule out too narrow/wide conceptions of the material essence of seeing something red
this research will inevitably lead to more than one candidate for the material essence, that you can�t decide between
let�s say we narrow it down to a specific kind of neurotransmitter in humans that corresponds to seeing redness � then there�ll be various structural properties in humans that correspond to seeing redness
Ned Block (forthcoming in J. Phil)� Commander Data android � same causal structure realised in physically different way
research on humans isn�t going to distinguish the strictly physical properties from the structural properties that both always coincide with seeing red � surely though this is just the usually scientific problem of insufficient data? we just need some examples that dissociate the two and then we can see which one gives rise to seeing red
now, we can�t get structural properties without physical properties (since the physical properties underly the structural) but we can get the physical without structural. so then we ask Commander Data (P without S)
but he�ll say he sees something red whether or not he really is, since after all his causal structure is identical to a human�s, i.e. Data�s verbal report may not be referring to the same thing (the same phenomenal concept???) as ours
so our methodology breaks down, when there are more than one physical properties that go hand in hand in human beings when they report a given phenomenal concept
or to put it another way, if you�re representationist about consciousness, do you identify with broad or narrow (intra-cranial) physical properties? (???)
this research won�t decide between HOT and non-HOT of consciousness
so there will be alternatives left up for grabs
inflationists (those who recognise phenomenal concepts) are in trouble � those who trade in phenomenal concepts
he argues against inflationism + non-dualism
we just have to recognise that phenomenal concepts are just vague
well, the concepts might not be vague, just because it is difficult for us to know them
phenomenal concepts are terms that are completely cut off from any causal or behavioural properties
they are terms created just by examples
so such a concept won�t be sharp enough to make it definite whether or not there is a Commander Data inside or not � it�s not indeterminate for Commander Data
considers hallucinogenic drugs or synaesthesia � is this really �seeing red�?
this is like the above examples of having more than one material property left for the referent of a phenomenal property
we can find out surprising facts about the material nature of conscious properties in humans � it�s just because the phonomenal concepts are too fuzzy
from what little I understand of them both, Papineau seems pretty indistinguishable from Dennett
what are the �standard anti-materialist arguments (� Kripke's modal argument, and Levine's argument from "the explanatory gap")�???
what�s the difference between materialism in terms of type identity, token identity, realization, or supervenience??? what is realization??? and what does this mean: �They need to explain whether they think of causation in terms of events, facts, or states of affairs. And they need to explain exactly how they understand all these terms, not to mention how they understand the terms which frame the debate in the first place, such as "material" or "physical".�
what�s �the "completeness" (or "causal closure") of physics�???
what is the difference between an �explanatory primitive�/identity (Papineau�s materialism) and a �fundamental law� (Chalmers)???
surely Papineau�s theory is empty unless it�s predictive in some way, or lets us know when/whether something�s conscious??? or testable/falsifiable??? does it admit degrees of consciousness???
what methods are available to us in our scientific search other than the psychophysical report???
how is this different to Dennett�s �heterophenomenology�:???
�the neutral
path leading from objective physical science and its insistence on the
third-person point of view, to a method of phenomenological description that
can (in principle) do justice to the most private and ineffable subjective
experiences, while never abandoning the methodological principles of science. (CE,
p72.)�
�How does it
work?� We start with recorded raw data.
Among these are the vocal sounds people make (what they say, in other words),
but to these verbal reports must be added all the other manifestations of
belief, conviction, expectation, fear, loathing, disgust, etc.,� including any and all internal conditions
(e.g. brain activities, hormonal diffusion, heart rate changes, etc.)
detectable by objective means.�
�we devise interpretations of the subjects� speech acts, which we thus get to treat as (apparent) expressions of their beliefs, on all topics. Thus using the intentional stance (Dennett, 1971, 1987), we construct therefrom the subject�s heterophenomenological world. We move, that is, from raw data to� interpreted data: a catalogue of the subjects� convictions, beliefs, attitudes, emotional reactions, . . . (together with much detail regarding the circumstances in which these intentional states are situated), but then we adopt a special move, which distinguishes heterophenomenology from the normal interpersonal stance: the subjects� beliefs (etc.) are all bracketed for neutrality�
do you think that�ll tell you why only brains, and only certain activity within brains give rise to consciousness??? what happens if we can�t see what is special about these material references that makes them conscious??? are we led to a kind of panpsychism??? will this scientific approach tell us about personal identity???
what�s the hard problem??? is it the identifying of material essence with phenomenal concept??? or is it explaining why???
is he being an eliminativist???
isn�t this simply a restatement of the problem of other minds???
is there any reason to think that most problems won�t be problematic in the way you outlined???
will it be predictive??? will it explain why or how things are the way they are??? will it allow us to predict what alien physiology will/won�t be conscious???
is this really science??? it�s just the first stage, correlations without understanding underlying theories/laws
closet eliminitivist???
this is non-explanatory, non-predictive purely correlational pre-science
how different from Dennett??? Chalmers???
won�t most phenomenal concepts have un-entanglable material essence candidates???
does the Mary thought-experiment work in the face of innate cognitive mechanisms (e.g. for colour processing)???
might knowledge of parallel underlying cognitive systems help us cut clean divisions in our experience??? neurophysiology undermining the private language argument???
what about spectrum inversion � heterophenomenology doesn�t help here either � 2 unentanglable phenomenal concepts???
ideally be able to predict/quantify the level of conscious experience that will arise from a given computation
surely your science of consciousness cnanot eliminate panpsychism???
he seemed to more or less agree with this
representational theory of consciousness???
natural kinds???
vague = �undefined�??? he prefers �badly defined�, or perhaps �ambiguous�
apply to cases where there�s no fact of the matter
in a sense then, is he saying that the problem/question/concept of consciousness is ill-posed???
how is the baptism (the naming of the private experience) supposed to work?
well-known Wittgensteinian arguments against formation of a concept in good standing just by attending one�s own experiences and giving them names
e.g. Mary, who sees a colour for the first time � can she name that colour??? she might think �I�ll have that experience again before the day is out� � is that a perfectly good thought
Wittgenstein wouldn�t like the way that Papineau has described Mary naming new colour-related phenomenal concepts
she can�t communicate the content of her thought to us initially if we don�t see the colour � but Papineau thinks her thought �I�ll see that again� has a truth-value
surely she�d never have exactly the same experience again � that nit-pickiness about the exact shade and its representation in the NS is different from the question of baptising that internal experience
Quinean �
different from property dualism??? y, obviously � concepts are what refer to properties
this was all to link all phenomenal concepts to material concepts � now he�s forced to say that this won�t always be possible